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“Today is a triumph for freedom as huge as any victory that has ever been 
won on any battlefield…  It was only at Appomattox, a century ago, that an 
American victory was also a Negro victory. And the two rivers—one shining 
with promise, the other darkstained with oppression—began to move toward 
one another.” 
-President Lyndon Johnson, upon passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965)1 
 
“I cannot help but believe that the inevitable effect of [the Voting Rights 
Act] which forces any one of the States to entreat federal authorities in far-
away places for approval of local laws before they can become effective is to 
create the impression that the State or States treated in this way are little 
more than conquered provinces.” 
-Justice Hugo Black, Partly Dissenting from the Majority Opinion in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966)2 
 
Every narrative of conquest contains at least two stories.3 What the 
conqueror may narrate as a triumphal story of progress, the conquered would 
recount as the tragic defeat of a noble cause.4  But defeats are sometimes only 
provisional, fortunes are reversed, and the victors’ most compelling accounts 
of justice may slip through their grasp and change sides (to borrow a phrase 
from Simone Weil) like a “fugitive from the camp of the conquerors.”5  At 
least since Reconstruction, the implementation of voting rights in the United 
States has shuttled back and forth between two opposing narratives of 
conquest, embodying two different struggles for recognition: (1) the struggle 
for dignity and equality accorded to historically disadvantaged minorities, 
1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965. Volume II, 
entry 394, 811–15. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966 available at 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650806.asp. 
2 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 360 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
3 Ranajit Guha, A Conquest Foretold, 54 SOCIAL TEXT 96, 97 (1998) (According to Guha, “there is 
no conquest that has only one story to it. It is made up of at least two-one narrated by the 
conquerors and the other by the conquered.” … [F]or every narrative of triumph and hope told in 
the conqueror’s voice there is a counternarrative of defeat and despair told by the conquered.”)  
4 Id. See also WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH, THE CULTURE OF DEFEAT: ON NATIONAL TRAUMA, 
MOURNING, AND RECOVERY (2003) (Taking the examples of the American South after the Civil 
War, France after its defeat by Prussia in 1871, and Germany after World War I, explaining 
production of myths of the unworthy barbarous enemy, of the cultural superiority of the defeated, 
and creating narratives of revanchism and renewal, for example).  
5 SIMONE WEIL, GRAVITY AND GRACE 171 (Trans. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr) (1952, 
2002). (“If we know in what way society is unbalanced, we must do what we can to add weight to 
the lighter scale…we must have formed a conception of equilibrium and be ever ready to change 
sides like justice, that fugitive from the camp of the conquerors”). 
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and (2) the struggle for dignity and equality accorded to states. In the case of 
the former, a civil war was fought to emancipate and enfranchise an enslaved 
population, recognition was extended through the amendment of the 
Constitution; these purposes were frustrated by Jim Crow laws, and once 
again vindicated by the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).6  In the case 
of the latter, Southern states struggled for self-determination; they were 
defeated in battle and conquered through Reconstruction and after years of 
resistance they were conquered again by federal courts and Congress,7 who 
set about aggrandizing their power in the guise of empowering minority 
populations.8  Despite their competing purposes, the two narratives are not 
particularly different in form. They both agree upon a basic chronology, the 
fact of oscillation, and make common gestures towards which camp could 
claim provisional victory and which could claim defeat at any given point.9 
For the most part, with intermittent bursts of violence and coercion, claims to 
recognition were not played out on a battlefield, but within a single 
constitutional order and in the framing of election laws.10  Rather than pins 
on a battle map, the markers of victory and defeat have moved to the courts 
and legislatures.11  
6 Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1808-10. (Making a parallel 
argument, placing the federal enforcement of minority rights at the very heart of the 
Reconstruction Power, so that the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans discrimination in public 
accommodations, is not only a legitimate exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment; it is a paradigmatic example of that power.).  
7 The votes for and against the Voting Rights Act were much more closely along state lines than 
party lines, with opposition heavily and almost exclusively concentrated in states that would be 
subject to the coverage formula, and which had historically belonged to the Confederacy. The 
states in the House of Representatives who formed solid blocs opposing the passage of the Act 
included were Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina, Mississippi, and South Carolina. In the 
Senate it was all of those states plus Louisiana, Florida, Georgia and Virginia. See "To Pass S. 
1564, The Voting Rights Act Of 1965," available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/89-
1965/s78. To Pass H.R. 6400, The 1965 Voting Rights Act Of 1965" available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/89-1965/h87. 
8 J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE 
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999); J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two 
Reconstructions, in BERNARD GROFMAN & CHANDLER DAVIDSON EDS. CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY 
VOTING 141 (1992). 
9 Of course, over time, the proponents within each camp might differ in the way they identify the 
opposing camp, (“minorities” or “federal authorities” or in the 19th century “Republicans”) and 
even themselves (“southern Whites,” “the South” or “states” or in the 18th and 20th century 
“Republicans”). With each side defining themselves “the People” the meaning of the Constitution 
is similarly divided among states’ rightists and Nationalists. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty 
and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1452 (1987). 
10 LAUGHLIN  MCDONALD, A VOTING RIGHTS ODYSSEY: BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT IN GEORGIA  23 
(2003) (in the summer of 1868, Georgia expelled 32 black representatives from their state 
assembly, leading Congress to place the state under military rule). 
11 Numerous writers have reversed Clausewitz’s famous dictum to observe, that “politics is the 
continuation of war by other means.” See e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: 
274 
 
                                         
 
A Fugitive From The Camp of The Conquerors:  The Revivial of Equal 
Sovereignty Doctrine in Shelby County v. Holder 
 
 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shelby County v. Holder 
belongs to the second of these contending narratives.12  The Court attempts 
to give expression to a cause that has not been able to succeed either on the 
battlefield or through popular representation, and found only fleeting support 
in constitutional doctrine. At the time the VRA was passed, it made sense, 
from a legislative point of view, to focus on “bad actors” (through a Section 4 
“coverage formula”) and to put a burden on these proven offenders to 
demonstrate their proposed laws would not discriminate (through Section 5’s 
pre-clearance procedures). 13  Though the VRA survived a constitutional 
challenge,14 each time it was amended,15 there remained an undercurrent of 
discontent and an intuition, articulated through any number of constitutional 
provisions and quasi-constitutional arguments, that the law posed a 
significant intrusion on federalism and state sovereignty. Before Shelby 
County v. Holder, there remained nine states and local governments in seven 
other states 16  that were required to get permission from the Justice 
Department or a Federal Court before they could change any law dealing 
with voting. In the brief few months since Shelby County v. Holder, without a 
coverage formula, many of them have already started experimenting with 
laws that, if passed, will have a disparate impact on minority communities. 
The possibility of massive disenfranchisement through legislation and local 
LECTURES AT THE COLLÉGE DE FRANCE, 1975-76 15 (2003). Putting the matter a bit more precisely, 
Elias Canetti describes electoral politics after a civil war: “But the two factions remain; they fight 
on, but in a form of warfare which has renounced killing.” Nevertheless, writes Canetti, electoral 
politics maintains “the psychological structure of opposing armies.” ELIAS CANETTI, CROWDS AND 
POWER (Trans. Carol Stewart) 188-190 (1960, 1978). It may be noted that in some parts of the 
world, such as India, political candidates do not say they “run for office” they say they “fight 
elections”; political parties do not say they “contest” or “win” elections, they say they “take power.”  
In the U.S. the metaphors of war and conquest are curiously missing from colloquial speech and it 
their place we find the softer metaphors of sport. Still, no one who has watched the zero-sum 
game of partisan politics in the U.S. will fail to recognize its bellicose character.   
12 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2622, n.1 (2013). 
13 This originally applied to states that had used a discriminatory voting law or method that was 
in effect in November 1964. More recently, the formula was changed to key it to the situation as of 
1972. 
14 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 
(1973); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Lopez v. Monterrey County, 525 U.S. 
266 (1999).   
15 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577; Voting Rights Act Amendments 
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131; Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub.  L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400; 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84  Stat. 314. 
16 The jurisdictions most recently covered by section 5 are the states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, counties in California, 
Florida, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota, and townships in Michigan and New 
Hampshire. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. at 100-01 (2009).  For a complete list of jurisdictions covered 
by Section 5, See Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Section 5  Covered 
Jurisdictions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/covered.php.   
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regulations has returned for the first time since Voting Rights Act was 
passed in 1965. For now it is unclear how the purposes of the VRA – to 
prevent discriminatory laws- will be enforced.17  
 
The Court’s decision, whose narrowest focus was on the 
constitutionality of the pre-clearance formula in Voting Rights Act, also stood 
in legal terms for a broader conflict over Congress’s enforcement power of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and in cultural terms for the 
expression that a state is a bearer of rights to equality and dignity. The 
provisional victory this time was to strike down the central provision of the 
Voting Rights Act – which enumerated the states required to seek federal 
pre-clearance. Opponents and supporters alike took note of the candor with 
which it took aim at past offenders, often Southern states, and for this it had 
been called the “Crown Jewel of the Second Reconstruction.”18  
 
In this essay, I will argue that the real surprise in Shelby County was 
not that such large stakes would be expressed in the opinion, but that the 
essential core of the Act could be disposed of with reference to an obscure 
principle — “equal sovereignty of the states”— with little stature in the 
constitutional canon.19 After being rejected outright in the landmark South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) decision, “equality of sovereignty” is first 
mentioned as a “fundamental principle” in Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District Number One v. Holder (Northwest Austin)20 and relied upon in 
Shelby County as the rationale to strike down Article 4 of the VRA.21 In 
relying on Katzenbach for its holding, the Court audaciously cites as its 
primary authority the very case that it is overturning. The majority’s 
boldness in this regard has not gone unnoticed. 22  In Justice Ginsburg’s 
17 Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingency 
Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 131 (2013), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/06/07/charlesfuentesrohwer.html.; Heather Gerken,, “A Third Way 
for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach” (August 22, 2005). Harvard Public 
Law Working Paper No. 118. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=788067 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.788067. 
18 Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the 
Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1594 (2002) (describing the Act as “the 
crown jewel of the Second Reconstruction”). Karlan may be drawing upon President Reagan, 
who after resisting some of the provisions extending the act in 1982, finally signed, 
proclaiming the right to vote “the crown jewel of American liberties,” Reagan Signs Voting 
Rights Act Extension).Washington Post, June 30, 1982, SA, at 1.  
19 Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. at 2621. (“The Act also differentiates between the States, 
despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy “equal sovereignty”.”).  
20 Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009).  
21 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. at  9–17. 
22Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 177 (2013), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/06/08/fishkin.html. (“Rather audaciously, the  NAMUDNO Court 
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dissent to Shelby, she comments that such a construction does “much 
mischief.” 23  I will argue that the doctrine, as presented and largely 
misrepresented by the majority, does a great deal of work for justices who 
have a purposive goal of giving states greater autonomy notwithstanding the 
strictures of the Civil War amendments.24   
 
Like a player in a game of charades, the majority is quiet but insistent, 
expressive and also focused on a message. In a series of gestures that are 
difficult to miss even if they are silent, the court manages to do the following: 
(1) it mischaracterizes and misapplies a precedent, Katzenbach, and 
overturns it with no acknowledgement of this move, (2) it quietly revives and 
expands an older notion of “equal footing” in part by renaming it “equal 
sovereignty of states” and (3) it applies and inaugurates (again, without 
saying so) a heightened scrutiny test. In this essay, I situate the current state 
of these three phenomena - the line of cases regarding voting rights, the 
doctrine of “equality sovereignty of states,” and the level of scrutiny-  by first 
excavating the history of the revived equality doctrine through the older idea 
of “equal footing,” then exploring the expressive power of this decision, and 
finally, by reading the Court’s likely intent regarding a future of the standard 
of review through a close reading of the subtlety of what precedent it does 
and does not rely on.  The careful reading of this decision and its selective use 
of precedent is necessary for us to understand how a minor jurisprudence 
stoked carefully and patiently, can emerge fully formed in a decision of such 
importance and far reaching consequence.  
 
When seen as primarily an expressive statement about federalism, it 
becomes clearer how it risks little and gains much. It seems to be about 
federalism, but there is no reference to the relevant precedents; it seems to 
require heightened scrutiny for states, but the reasoning is obscure. Without 
specifying current jurisprudence on federalism, it expresses what “ought” to 
be understood. The expressive function of this doctrine is its most important 
function.25 If the doctrinal sources were obscure, its function and intention 
was unmistakable. The majority may be committed to particular views on 
quoted this very sentence from Katzenbach as support for the idea that a “doctrine of the equality 
of the states” exists— concealing the part about how “that doctrine applies only to the terms upon 
which States are admitted to the Union” behind a strategically placed ellipsis”).  
23 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. at 2649 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).  
24 There are two kinds of dignitary harms that are possible in federal oversight of elections 
redressed by “equal sovereignty”: that they are targeted (and thus stigmatizing) and that they are 
punitive. Thus, the two critiques expressed by the Shelby County majority— (1) a critique of 
selectivity, and (2) a critique of conditionality— are already familiar parts of a narrative of 
conquest.  
25 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 44 U. PENN. L. REV.2021 (1996).  
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federalism, the separation of powers, and the benign racial classification in 
an increasingly post-racial color-blind society, in which states could once 




II. “Equal Sovereignty of States”:  An Equivocal Doctrine 
1. The Equality of States: Built on Air?  
 
Within hours of the publication of the Shelby decision, commentators 
were scratching their heads over the reasoning for the result, specifically 
Justice Roberts’s invocation of “equal sovereignty of the states” which he calls 
a “fundamental principle.”26 Richard Posner countered that “there is no such 
principle… it does not exist,” calling the doctrine an act of “conservative 
imagination” and emphasizing that it is “built on air.” 27  Another 
commentator called the doctrine “the Chief Justice's invention”28 and even 
the most thorough scholarly account of the doctrine, locating its pedigree in 
“equal footing doctrine,” still concludes that the Chief Justice’s version is a 
“non-existent principle.”29  
 
Of all the purposes and principles that could be served, the emphasis 
“equality of states” was an eccentric one. But seeing that the court was bent 
upon creating such a doctrine, what is its function? The court consolidated 
gains in more difficult battles, and recovered ground from past defeats, by 
smuggling its concerns on the back of a relatively obscure doctrine the “equal 
footing doctrine” whose scope and purpose is limited, one that originally 
expressed the ideal by which states previously excluded from full 
membership within the Federal system would become participants. In 
Shelby, the dignity of the state is offended by being treated differently by the 
Federal government from other states. Fundamentally, this is not a 
26 “There is also a "fundamental principle of equal sovereignty" among the States, which is highly 
pertinent in assessing disparate treatment of States.” 
27 Richard Posner, SLATE.com (“This is a principle of constitutional law of which I had never 
heard--for the excellent reason that…there is no such principle.”). 
28 See e.g., Paul Abrams, “The Fifteenth Amendment Trumps the Tenth Amendment on Voting 
Rights,” Huffington Post. July 1, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-abrams/the-Fifteenth-
amendment-trumps_b_3527256.html. (“But Equal Sovereignty is the Chief Justice's invention. It 
is not in the Constitution and, if anything, the structure of the Constitution and the make-up of 
the government it created show that there was no intention to accord states equal sovereignty”). 
29 Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
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controversy “between states” but remains one of unequal treatment by 
Federal law. Thus, though it still implicates federalism, more than any 
previous claims about “state dignity”.30 But more than equal dignity, or even 
“equal footing,” the goal was to establish the equivalent of an “equal 
protection” analysis that could be applied to states. Once the generic 
invocation of “equality” is made, the problem becomes one whose implicit 
structure could draw upon equal protection analysis.  We will return to the 
attempts to create such a broad principle in a moment. First, we must 
understand the narrower “equal footing” doctrine and the reasons such a 
doctrine never took root in relation to voting rights issues.  
 
Is it correct to say, with Judge Posner, that the equal sovereignty of 
states is a constitutional principle, which simply “does not exist”? Though 
text and original intent disfavor the very existence of an equal footing 
doctrine, and Congress's power to admit states and determine the conditions 
for their admission has generally been broad, the equal footing doctrine 
emerges as a minor jurisprudence –beginning with Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan 
(1845)31 and ending with Coyle v. Smith (1911)32 to apply certain limits to 
Congress in this narrow area. 33  Under the "equal footing" doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot impose conditions on a state's 
entry that would place that state on an unequal footing with the existing 
states. The narrow reading was confirmed by Katzenbach, but has now been 
broadened considerably by Northwest Austin and Shelby County v. Holder.  
 
First, the principle of state equality has not existed in constitution, but 
in a different kind of tradition. There is, instead a much narrower concept 
embodied in that the several states are equal in sovereignty and entitled to 
equal treatment under the Constitution and that no state may be admitted to 
the Union under more restrictive conditions.34 The crucial question is not 
30 Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE at 175, citing Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 41-42, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder. In the sovereign immunity context, the doctrine of 
state dignity was delineated by the Court in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). See also Evan 
H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 81 
(2001); Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV., 
(Mar., 2003) pp. 1-107. 
31 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
32 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
33Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on 
States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119 (2004) at 125. See Debates in the Federal 
Convention 1787 which Framed the Constitution of the United States of America Reported by 
James Madison (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1999) at 487-88.    
34 A more detailed account of non-existent doctrine and the actual doctrine of equal footing 
Zachary Price, Shelby County v. Holder: The Voting Rights Act Doesn’t Need to Treat States 




                                         
 
TOURO LAW JOURNAL OF RACE, GENDER, & ETHNICITY & 
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN LAW AND POLICY 
 
 
whether there is equality between states, but whether there is a tradition of 
deference to the states in certain matters. There was, until the 
Reconstruction Amendments, a tradition of this sort, despite the fact that 
such a principle cannot be located in the text of the Constitution or original 
intent of the framers. Indeed, the framers at the Constitutional Convention 
took care to remove “a provision that would have required all new states to be 
admitted on an equal footing with the original states.”35 The doctrine finds no 
home in the text of the constitution, though it is rhetorically allied to or the 
Articles of Confederation. 36  Section 3 Article IV of the United States 
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment and in constitutional principles.37 It also 
has to be understood in light of the Reconstruction Amendments that limited 
and contextualized its application throughout and after the Civil War. These 
Articles and Amendments did not form a unified doctrine but played off of 
each other at different historical periods, just as they do today. Article IV 
says each state will have “a republican form of government.” This can be read 
as a guarantee to the states that they may govern themselves without 
excessive interference from the national government, or a requirement of a 
minimal standard of government and participation guaranteed by the 
Federal government against the states.38 At the time of the ratification of the 
Constitution, including its Tenth Amendment, enumerated powers were 
granted from the states to the federal government. These include Article I, 
Section 8, where Congress’s powers are enumerated. According to Madison, 
the Tenth Amendment is a truism, but added to restate the logic of the 
document as a whole 39  Even so, with each subsequent amendment, 
35  Biber supra note 33; the Debates supra at note 33.  
36 Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867) (footnote omitted). 
37 Justice Kennedy specifies the name of the doctrine in the oral arguments to Shelby (“I don't 
know why under the equal footing doctrine it would be proper to just single out States by name, 
and if that, in effect, is what is being done, that seemed to me equally improper”). Equal footing 
requires that "new states since admitted [to the Union be afforded] ... the same rights, sovereignty 
and jurisdiction . . .as the original States possess within their respective borders."' In Pollard v. 
Hagan," the Supreme Court applied the equal footing doctrine to hold that newly admitted states 
acquired title to the riverbeds of all navigable waterways within their boundaries.' Mumford v. 
Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867) (footnote omitted). (Arguing “the foundation of the 
equal footing doctrine is the tenth amendment”) 
38 According to William M. Wiecek, “The guarantee clause is unique in that it is the only 
restriction in the federal Constitution on the form or structure of the state governments. It 
empowers the federal government to oversee the organization and functioning of the states. It 
authorizes Congress and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the President and the Supreme Court to 
superintend the acts and the structure of the state governments and to inhibit any tendencies in a 
state that might deprive its people of republican government. Such a broad potential is rooted in 
the vague and unqualified wording of the clause.” William M. Wicek the guarantee, 210 Clause to 
Constitute (1972)   Felix Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes," 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 525, 537 (1947) (calling the clause “a sleeping giant”).  
39 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). “While the Tenth Amendment has been 
characterized as a ‘truism,” stating merely that ‘all is retained which has not been surrendered,’ 
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particularly the Reconstruction Amendments, the logic, and the content of 
those enumerated powers, and those reserved to the states, changes. Also 
throughout this period, less sweeping changes are made through the judicial 
articulation of constitutional doctrine.  
 
2. Equal Footing: From the First Reconstruction to Revival in 
Coyle 
 
If in the modern period, as seen in a case like Shelby County, 
federalism concerns were fought between the Tenth Amendment (which 
seeks to protect the sovereignty of states by preserving their rights of self-
government) and the Fifteenth Amendment (gives Congress authority to pass 
laws to end the denial of voting rights based on race), federalism concerns 
were fought out on different plane. Before the passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, some of these concerns were embodied in a tension between the 
Congress’s power to “Guarantee a Republican Government” and a state’s 
“right” to be admitted on an equal footing to those who came before it. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the narrow “equal footing” doctrine 
soon became central to how courts interpreted and conditions imposed on 
state admission by Congress.40 
 
Imposition of particular burdens on a minority of states by a 
democratic majority is not a problem from the point of view of democratic 
theory. The basis for the legitimacy of the VRA is on surer ground than the 
imposition of the Fourteenth Amendment on a South, the imposition of the 
Constitution on new states formed out of the territories, or the imposition of 
the Constitution on later generations. 41  These were the problems of the 
nineteenth century of which the equal footing doctrine was one small part.  
 
The not-quite-constitutionalized Equal Footing doctrine, as definitively 
articulated in Coyle (1912) states that Congress cannot constitutionally 
impose a condition on the admission of a state that “otherwise would be 
outside Congress's power to legislate for any other state.”42 The Supreme 
[citing Darby], it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the 
constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ 
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.” Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 
542, 547 n.7 (1975). This policy was effectuated, at least for a time, in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
40Biber, supra note 33 at 200-08.  
41 Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment: Northern-Only 
Constitutional Authorship and Neglected Reconstruction History (August 28, 2013). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2317471.  
42 Coyle, 221 U.S. at 573-74. 
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Court had developed the equal footing doctrine to address a particular 
problem. Congress has constitutional authority to admit new states to the 
Union and even has the power to impose conditions towards statehood. The 
problem would arise if it could impose any condition it liked on the admission 
of a new state it might use that power to create second-class states. While the 
term “second-class states” may hold rhetorical significance for states who feel 
they are differentially burdened by Federal regulation, the concept originally 
embodied the literal possibility of sub-states or pseudo-states being carved 
out of existing states or Western territories. These would, in effect, be held as 
“conquered provinces” available for plunder by Federal authorities and 
existing states. This fear of “leveling down” animated the equal footing 
doctrine. As it happened however, the usual pattern was imposing 
requirements for statehood that the state provide meaningful republican 
form of government, which can be seen as “leveling up.” There were also 
demands of loyalty (from the South) and conformity (from the West), but 
these too were seen in the light of “guarantee of Republican form of 
government.” These concerns are evident in two antebellum cases:  one 
involving New Orleans ordinance that allegedly violated the religious 
liberties requirement of the Louisiana Enabling Act, 43  and another case 
involved the enforceability of the ban on slavery in the Northwest 
Ordinance.44 More typically, though, the doctrine concerned more practical 
concerns where Federal jurisdiction was uncontroversial. Except for the two 
mentioned above, every “equal footing” case that reached the Supreme Court 
until Coyle v. Smith involved public lands, navigation of waterways, or 
Indian affairs.  
 
The rhetoric of “second-class states” resonates with those in the South 
who believe they are continually subject to selectivity and conditionality. By 
some accounts, prior to the Civil War, “federalism became the foundation of 
the ‘equal footing’ doctrine, which protected slavery’s expansion.”45 During 
the Reconstruction period, however, the doctrine was nowhere in sight. Prior 
to the Civil War, Equal Footing was not yet constitutionalized but Congress 
also did not explore take full advantage of its powers. It was eclipsed at the 
43 Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845). 
44 Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82 (1850). 
45 George William Van Cleve, “Founding a Slaveholders’ Union 1770-1797,” in JOHN CRAIG 
HAMMOND,  MATTHEW MASON, EDS., CONTESTING SLAVERY: THE POLITICS OF BONDAGE AND FREEDOM 
IN THE NEW AMERICAN NATION, 124 (2011). (Claiming “federalism became the foundation of the 
‘equal footing’ doctrine, which protected slavery’s expansion.”) (Application of Jeffersonian 
philosophy “that new territories and states should enter the union on an equal footing with the 
original states. Because each new jurisdiction had the right to decide its own political fate, it could 
not be dictated to by Congress on an issue such as slavery.”) One might wonder then if the 
Reconstruction Amendments might have abolished the equal footing doctrine completely. 
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time of Reconstruction, and when it was, disparate treatment was necessary.  
 
Amendments adopted to end discrimination against freed slaves, 
concentrated in one region of the country, and the adoption of these 
amendments may have compromised the full participation of the states 
particularly subject to the amendments.  After the Civil War and attempts to 
implement voting rights through ordinary legislation (or military orders), the 
Reconstruction Amendments were expressly designed to limit state 
sovereignty, granting Congress vast new power at the direct expense of the 
states. 46 And not just any states. While they took cognizance of the fact that 
Northern and Border States also attempted to disenfranchise Black voters, 
the most forceful implementation as well as resistance was located in the 
Southern States. In the First Reconstruction Act (1867), Congress refused to 
re-admit the former Confederate states into the Union unless they amended 
their constitutions to allow male citizen suffrage regardless of “race, color, or 
previous condition.”47 They further prevented states them from amending 
their constitutions to deprive these citizen of the right to vote.”48 The “equal 
footing doctrine” did not bar these conditions to re-entry to the Union. During 
the Civil War and Reconstruction, admission conditions were used by the 
Republican Party in an attempt to shape suffrage and citizenship rules to 
guarantee black suffrage (and Republican political power) in both Western 
and Southern states.”  
 
Instead it retreated into the larger narrative of states’ rights and failed 
to prevent Congress from imposing conditions on states for readmission to the 
Union. As an early historian of the Fifteenth Amendment stated in 1909 (just 
before the Coyle decision), before the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage, voting 
rights were on thin ground because of a broad, if somewhat vague, theory of 
state equality: “fear was freely expressed however that the theory of the 
46 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976) that the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed 
Congress to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.  The 
Court in that case said that the federalism concern, Eleventh Amendment immunity, was no 
concern at all, because the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to limit state sovereignty.  If the 
Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to work around the federalism concern of the Eleventh 
Amendment, surely it allows Congress to work around the federalism concern of the Tenth 
Amendment and Article IV.   
47 First Reconstruction Act (An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel 
States) ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 sec. 5 (1867). 
48 An Act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama and 
Florida to Representation in Congress, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73. (1868); An Act to Admit the State of 
Arkansas to Representation in Congress, ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72 (1868); An Act to Admit the State of 
Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (1870); An 
Act to Admit the State of Mississippi to Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 
19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (1870); An Act to Admit the State of Texas to Representation in the Congress of 
the United States, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (1870). 
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equality of the states was too deeply rooted in our constitutional system ever to 
make the observance of such a condition practically enforceable.”49 Thus the 
Fifteenth Amendment was expressly designed to supply “a new basis for the 
continuance of congressional control over the suffrage conditions of the 
Southern States. This basis could be surely and safely supplied only by 
means of a new grant of power from the nation in the form of a suffrage 
amendment to the Constitution which should contain the authorization to 
Congress to enforce its provisions.” 50 The articulation of “state equality,” 
however, was specifically overridden during the passage of the 
Reconstruction Amendments, and in any case has failed to take root beyond 
the narrow concern of the admission of states. In neither case did the Court 
ask whether Congress had treated similarly situated states differently; it 
simply asked whether Congress had exercised a valid federal power.51  
 
This contending principle of equality, the very one the Fifteenth 
Amendment was expressly introduced to displace, was not one “between 
states,” except in the sense that the Federal government was seen as acting 
on behalf of sectional interests in enforcing its mandates on certain states. 
 
The readmission of the Southern states was attached to a number of 
significant conditions, including the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and a requirement that the suffrage of all state citizens who 
had voting rights under the Reconstruction state constitutions-which 
provided for black suffrage52 never be abridged. Three of the Southern states 
were given additional conditions: a requirement that blacks not be excluded 
from public office,53 and a requirement that the states not reduce any rights 
blacks might have to public education under their existing Reconstruction 
constitutions. This requirement was in part prompted by the Georgia 
49 JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 18 
(1909). 
50 Id. at 21. 
51 In United States v. Sandoval, the Court upheld admission conditions designating certain areas 
of New Mexico as Indian country because such action was “within the regulating power of 
Congress.”  In Stearns v. Minnesota, the Court upheld admissions conditions requiring the state 
to preserve certain tax breaks on federal land ceded to the new state, because those conditions 
could just as well have been imposed in a land cession to any other state.   
52 First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); An Act to Admit the States of North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama and Florida to Representation in 
Congress, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73. (1868); see also An Act to Admit the State of Arkansas to 
Representation in Congress, ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72 (1868). 
53 An Act to Admit the State of Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the United States, 
ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (1870); see also An Act to Admit the State of Mississippi to Representation 
in the Congress of the United States, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (1870); An Act to Admit the State of 
Texas to Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (1870). 
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legislature's regression after readmission to exclude of all black legislators 
since the state constitution did not explicitly give blacks the right to hold 
public office. Georgia's action led to its continued exclusion from Congress 
and the threat of a re-imposition of military rule, until the state legislature 
backed down and readmitted the black legislators, as well as excluding 
legislators who could not pass the test oath requirements.54 Congress also 
required Georgia to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment in order to be 
readmitted.  
 
Clearly, undeterred by any notion of “equal footing” Congress believed 
self-government could be revoked or withheld when believed that the 
residents of the territory could not be trusted with self-government. The 
analogy to conquest is not inappropriate when put alongside non-
Reconstruction examples: the only other significant example of Congress 
restricting self-government for future states was in the territory of Utah from 
the 1870s through 1890s. In addition, New Mexico and California were both 
governed for a few years by military governments after their conquest in the 
Mexican War, and both Orleans and Florida was governed briefly by the 
military after their purchase.55  
 
The fact that Southern states were both targeted and coerced is not 
only a part of the narrative of the Conquered. Defenders of the process by 
which the Reconstruction Amendments passed are unapologetic about its 
necessary selectivity as well as its coercive aspect: According to Akhil Amar, 
aligning his defense of the Reconstruction Amendments to a more recent 
defense of VRA: “the Fourteenth Amendment was itself adopted by a process 
in which certain states were subject to a kind of selective preclearance.56 In a 
parallel register, drawing on his peculiar notion of “higher lawmaking,” Bruce 
Ackerman has argued that the most extraordinary departures from norms of 
equality would have been extra-constitutional but justifiable, as when the 
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments did not conform to the process 
54 See ALAN CONWAY, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GEORGIA 166-190 (1966). 
55 See JACK ERICSON EBSEN, THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED STATES EMPIRES: GOVERNORS AND 
TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT 17 84-1912, At 153 (1968). 
56 Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5 — and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARVARD L. REV. FORUM 
109, 113 In the very process by which section 5 and the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment were 
adopted, certain states with sorry electoral track records were obliged to get preapproval from 
federal officials in order to do things that other states with cleaner electoral track records were 
allowed to do automatically. But it would be preposterous to say that section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was itself illegal.” section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment itself unconstitutional? A 
mixed state of legal, political and military conquest spanned across a nine-year period from the 
outbreak of the War, its conclusion, the readmission of all the Confederate states, and the 
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments. 
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prescribed by Article V, with all the states as equal participants.57 Others 
have debated the degree to which these conformed to a valid Amendment 
making process. What is unmistakable, however, is that whether described in 
the language of constitutionalism, war or international law, there is an 
aspect of fait accompli. 
 
The context was again transformed with the passage of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. And there are further consequences that haunt 
the undertaking to rejoin the Union. When, after the Civil War the states and 
people took the extraordinary step of Amending the Constitution, they ceded 
to the central government other enumerated powers, thus adding to 
Congress's enumerated powers, the powers to abolish and prevent slavery 
(XIII), enforcement of due process, and equal protection of the laws (XIV), 
and preventing voting rights from being denied or abridged on the basis of 
race or color (XV). Our understanding of the Tenth Amendment must change 
with each subsequent amendment, and thus among the powers ceded by the 
States and given to Congress. It must be admitted that this was not without 
coercion by the Union and resistance by the former Confederate states. 
Certainly with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, whatever residual 
power the states may have had over ensuring that voting rights are protected 
regardless of race or color, it was no longer “reserved to the states,” but 
became a power of the central government. The Fifteenth Amendment 
created an additional enumerated power. “As such, it ‘amended’ the Tenth 
Amendment,” 58  providing Congress rather than either the States or the 
people, with the power to ensure that voting was neither denied nor abridged 
on account of race or color. 59  The language Section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation mirrors precisely Article I, Section 8, where 
Congress's powers, are enumerated.  
 
With the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the notion of a 
broad “equal protection” for states failed to take root, and the applicability of 
“equal footing” had to be construed as sufficiently narrow to allow the 
implementation of those Amendments.  
 
A generation after Reconstruction, however, a narrow doctrine re-
57 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99-119 (1998). 
58 Paul Abrams, “The Fifteenth Amendment Trumps the Tenth Amendment on Voting Rights,” 
Huffington Post. July 1, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-abrams/the-Fifteenth-
amendment-trumps_b_3527256.html.  
59 Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.  
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asserted itself just as it was becoming increasingly obsolete. Justice Horace 
H.  Lurton argued that: "this Union" “was and is a union of States, equal in 
power, dignity and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of 
sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself.”  It 
was developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Coyle v. Smith.60 At issue in 
Coyle was Congress' attempt to condition Oklahoma's admission into the 
Union on its agreement to locate the state capital in Guthrie and to accept 
certain limitations on its power to change its seat of government. Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court could find no constitutional language prohibiting the 
use of such conditions by the Congress, it “read the unwritten tradition of 
state equality into the Constitution.”61  Justice Horace H. Lurton, writing for 
the majority, reasoned:  
 
[T]he constitutional equality of the states is essential to 
the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic 
was organized. When that equality disappears we may remain a 
free people, but the Union will not be the Union of the 
Constitution.62 
 
In Coyle v. Smith, the Court held that Oklahoma could move its state 
capital even though the move violated a condition in its admission statute.  
The “power to locate its own seat of government,” the Court reasoned, is a 
state power, not a federal power, so Congress could not prevent Oklahoma 
from moving its capital after it was admitted as a state. Since the 
Reconstruction Acts were never challenged using Equal Footing doctrine, this 
remains the closest analogy to the “differential treatment” imposed by the 
VRA. And it is an analogy explicitly rejected in Katzenbach.  More often, the 
doctrine was applied in contexts concerning the ownership of the submerged 
lands beneath navigable waters. Here, and sometimes to the detriment of 
states, are assumed to be transferred to all states upon entry into the Union, 
since those attributes were inherited by the original thirteen states upon 
independence. 63  This includes that even with such a doctrine, disparate 
treatment is fine. Here, the analogy to voting rights would be even more 
strained. “Coyle might have had serious repercussions earlier in the 
nineteenth century when conditional admissions had been used to guarantee 
conformity and compatibility among the states as well as to protect federal 
interests.” As William Wiecek notes, the decision “cast serious doubt on one of 
60 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
61 Michael C. Tolley and Bruce A. Wallin, Coercive Federalism and the Search for Constitutional 
Limits, 25 PUBLIUS 73 (1995). 
62 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911). 
63 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 228-29. 
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the most important means of enforcing Reconstruction.” But of course, the 
point is academic: Coyle came “more than a generation after Reconstruction 
was abandoned.”64  
 
Perhaps traces of the equal footing doctrine remain in the Southern 
memory because the states were not subject to a single standard for 
admission as a state, but a process of readmission to the Union. The terms of 
admission for any of the states would have involved some degree of unequal 
bargaining power. Each of the territories aspiring to the benefits of statehood 
were subjected to conditions by an already powerful federal government. In 
this sense, it is unsurprising that the federal government would be able to 
guarantee its property interests, and impose certain limitations on state 
sovereignty.65  
 
The real question of Federalism is not whether there is equality 
between states, but whether there is a tradition of deference to the states in 
certain matters, and whether the language of equality was a part of this 
tradition. There was, until the Reconstruction Amendments, a tradition of 
this sort when Congress did not explore or take full advantage of its powers. 
It was definitively ended at the time of Reconstruction, and when it was, 
disparate treatment was necessary. Amendments adopted to end 
discrimination against freed slaves, concentrated in one region of the country, 
and conditions for readmission to the Union were imposed on the states that 
had seceded.  
 
 Although all states have been unequal to the power of the Federal 
government at the time of admission (or re-admission) to the Union, the 
factual claim that additional burdens were placed on Southern states at the 
time seems clear enough. More distantly, the analogy between the 
Reconstruction amendments and the VRA can even be sustained. Thus, from 
a moral point of view, the narrative of “disparate treatment” and “denial of 
equal protection” make sense in a strictly colloquial sense. As a legal matter, 
however, as discussed below in greater detail, the application of “equal 
protection” or “disparate treatment” analysis to states, has failed time and 
again.  
 
3. Equal Sovereignty: From Second Reconstruction to a Revival 
64 Wiecek supra note 38. 
65 PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION (1987); Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The 
Ambiguous History of a Constitutional Principle, 18 PUBLIUS 53 (1988); Peter S. Onuf, 
Territories and Statehood, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 83 (Jack P. Greene, 
ed. 1984).  Biber, supra note 33 at 119 (2004). 
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in Shelby County 
 
A century of resistance came to a legal end with the passage of the Voting 
Rights Act and at least the narrative of the descendants of slaves and those of 
the country as a whole “began to move toward one another.” But parts of the 
country were still recalcitrant. This recalcitrance was expressed in legal 
terms in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) the court recognized the 
ingenious defiance of certain states,66 and could not have failed to appreciate 
the ingenuity with which South Carolina constructed its legal challenge as 
well: 67 On the coverage formula, “they argue that the coverage formula 
prescribed in § 4(a)-(d): (1) “Violates the principle of the equality of States,” 
(2) “Denies due process by employing an invalid presumption and by barring 
judicial review of administrative findings, (3) Constitutes a forbidden bill of 
attainder, (4) Impairs the separation of powers by adjudicating guilt through 
legislation; and (5) “Abridge[s] due process by limiting litigation to a distant 
forum.”68  On Preclearance, they claimed that the review of new voting rules 
required in § 5: (1) Infringe(s) Article III by directing the District Court to 
issue advisory opinions. (2) Abridge(s) due process by limiting litigation to a 
distant forum.” In Katzenbach, the court summarily dismissed most of these 
arguments, noting that:  
 
A State is not a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment; The word "person" in the 
context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded 
to encompass the States of the Union, and, to our knowledge, 
this has never been done by any court.” “nor does it have 
standing to invoke the Bill of Attainder Clause…” or other 
claims “which exist only to protect private individuals or 
groups.69  
66 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966). 
67 They contend that the assignment of federal examiners authorized in § 6(b) abridges due 
process by precluding judicial review of administrative findings, and impairs the separation of 
powers by giving the Attorney General judicial functions; also that the challenge procedure 
prescribed in § 9 denies due process on account of its speed. 
68 Finally, South Carolina and certain of the amici curiae maintain that §§ 4(a) and 5, buttressed 
by § 14(b) of the Act, “abridge due process by limiting litigation to a distant forum.” 
69 383 U.S. 323-324. These provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are challenged on the 
fundamental ground that they exceed the powers of Congress and encroach on an area reserved to 
the States by the Constitution. (“South Carolina and certain of the amici curiae also attack 
specific sections of the Act for more particular reasons. They argue that the coverage formula 
prescribed in § 4(a)-(d) violates the principle of the equality of States, denies due process by 
employing an invalid presumption and by barring judicial review of administrative findings, 
constitutes a forbidden bill of attainder, and impairs the separation of powers by adjudicating 
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State of S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-324 (1966) 
The court takes more time with the equality claim. It would have been 
implausible to take the language of the equal protection clause and apply it to 
the equal protection of states. Located in the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the clause addresses states and says “no state shall…deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”70 Yet this 
was precisely what South Carolina attempted by citing the “equal footing 
doctrine.” The Katzenbach court called their bluff. 
 
The Court has said time and again that racial discrimination by the 
states, particularly when it concerns the fundamental right to vote, violates 
the Constitution.  The court in Katzenbach noted “unremitting and ingenious 
defiance in certain parts of the country.”71 In Katzenbach, the state of South 
Carolina was also ingenious in its legal arguments. Whereas the provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are challenged on the fundamental ground that 
they exceed the powers of Congress and encroach on an area reserved to the 
States by the Constitution, the court noted:  
 
South Carolina and certain of the amici curiae also attack specific 
sections of the Act for more particular reasons. They argue that the 
coverage formula prescribed in § 4(a)-(d) violates the principle of the 
equality of States, denies due process by employing an invalid 
presumption and by barring judicial review of administrative findings, 
constitutes a forbidden bill of attainder, and impairs the separation of 
powers by adjudicating guilt through legislation 
 
Prior to this argument, couched among others, equal footing doctrine had 
guilt through legislation. They claim that the review of new voting rules required in § 5 infringes 
Article III by directing the District Court to issue advisory opinions. They contend that the 
assignment of federal examiners authorized in § 6(b) abridges due process by precluding judicial 
review of administrative findings, and impairs the separation of powers by giving the Attorney 
General judicial functions; also that the challenge procedure prescribed in § 9 denies due process 
on account of its speed. Finally, South Carolina and certain of the amici curiae maintain that §§ 
4(a) and 5, buttressed by § 14(b) of the Act, abridge due process by limiting litigation to a distant 
forum. Some of these contentions may be dismissed at the outset. The word "person" in the 
context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of 
interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and, to our knowledge, this has 
never been done by any court”).  
70 “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.” 
71 State of S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 303.  
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never been the argument that “equal protection” applied to states.72  
 
“Disparate treatment” can be challenged under equal protection analysis, 
which requires heightened scrutiny for laws discriminating against discrete 
and insular minorities. States, however, have never been the subjects of 
equal protection analysis. The notion that states qualify for equal protection 
was rejected out of hand by the court in Katzenbach. So was the more limited 
claim that states were entitled to “equal sovereignty” under the equal footing 
doctrine as articulated under Coyle v. Oklahoma, the narrow rule that new 
states enter the Union on an equal footing with their predecessors. 73 South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach confined Coyle to its facts, declaring that the equality 
rule limits Congress only with respect to the admission of states, the coverage 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were not barred by any “doctrine 
of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina” “for that doctrine 
applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and 
not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” 74 
Stating that South Carolina v. Katzenbach has limited Coyle to the narrow 
holding that Congress must treat states equally in admitting them).75  
 
Between Katzenbach76 and Shelby County, in a period that included 
landmark cases both on both sides of the Federal/States rights question, the 
precise argument that states are entitled to equal protection never emerged 
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. But more often than not, even for 
those who promote state’s rights as against the federal government, the 
“equality” aspect has been redundant in federalism. Some have argued that 
72 Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
Online 24 (2013). http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/NYULawReviewOnline-88-1-
Price_0.pdf (“[T]he equal footing doctrine doesn’t support the idea that otherwise valid federal 
legislation treating states unequally is suspect”). 
73 The Supreme Court developed the equal footing doctrine to address a particular problem.  
Congress has constitutional authority to admit new states to the Union, but if it could impose any 
condition it liked on the admission of a new state, it might use that power to create second-class 
states.  In other words, it might disadvantage new states by impairing their sovereignty in ways 
that it couldn’t have done for the old states.  To prevent such discrimination against new states, 
the Court held that congressional conditions on a state’s admission to the Union are enforceable 
only if Congress could have imposed them on an existing state.  So, for example, in Coyle v. Smith, 
the Court held that Oklahoma could move its state capital even though the move violated a 
condition in its admission statute.  The “power to locate its own seat of government,” the Court 
reasoned, is a state power, not a federal power, so Congress could not prevent Oklahoma from 
moving its capital after it was admitted as a state. 
74 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966). 
75 See e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 378-397. 
76 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966) (upholding provision of Voting 
Rights Act that provides stricter review of voting laws in Southern states against challenge that it 
violates "equal footing" doctrine. 
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stands as a precedent that supports current Supreme Court jurisprudence 
that the federal government lacks the power to "compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal program.”77 In a couple of federalism cases, however, 
Coyle was cited, though not for the proposition of “equality of states.” In other 
cases, state dignity has been formulated without reference to Coyle.  
 
a. Coyle Cited for Purposes other than Equal Sovereignty 
 
Coyle has not proved dispositive in any case up to this point “sovereign 
equality” was not treated as a substantive limitation upon federal power. 
National League of Cities v. Usery, famously held that federal regulation of 
state employee wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act intrudes so much 
on “traditional governmental functions” that it violates the Tenth 
Amendment).78 (relying in part on Coyle).  
 
On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, counsel for New 
York in New York v. United States79 argued that, even after Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,80 the equality rule was at least one 
substantive limitation upon federal power, though picked up for some 
rhetorical flourish in her opinion for the U. S. Justice O'Connor Supreme 
Court, cited Coyle: 
 
While Congress has substantial powers to govern the 
Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the 
States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer 
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern 
according to Congress’ instructions.81  
-Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) 
 
Coyle is cited here, but not for the “equality” but a broader “anti-
coercion principle.” Michael C. Tolley and Bruce A. Wallin have argued 
“Justice O'Connor had been interested in the Coyle doctrine for some time.”82  
77 Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1161, 1195-96 (1998) (arguing that Coyle stands as a precedent that supports current Supreme 
Court jurisprudence that the federal government lacks the power to "compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal program”). 
78 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1976). 
79 942 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir 1991). 
80 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 469 U.S. 528, 556, 574 (1985) (overruling 
National League of Cities). 
81 See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911). 
82 Michael C. Tolley and Bruce A. Wallin, Coercive Federalism and the Search for Constitutional 
Limits, 25 PUBLIUS 73 (1995) (least specific of several theories attacking unequal burdens imposed 
by unfunded mandates). 
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Apparently dissatisfied with the way the Court in Justice O'Connor set out to 
restore the doctrine to its pre-1966 status.83  
 
Because of its holding limiting the power of Congress to impose 
conditions on newly-admitted states, it has been cited by the Supreme Court 
as an important example of the basic nature of state sovereignty in the 
federal system, and of its core, inviolable features, First cited in her dissent 
in Garcia, the equality rule of Coyle reappeared again, this time in her 
opinion for the Court in New York v. United States.84 Although the equality 
rule may be more suited to evaluating the claim by states that unfunded 
mandates, because of their differential impact, place them on an unequal 
footing with other states, its use by Justice O'Connor to support her reading 
of the inherent state-sovereignty limitations of the Tenth Amendment…85 
There is simply no evidence that, simply because she took it to support her 
position on anti-coercion, Justice O’Connor sought to over-extend the Coyle 
doctrine to a new area, or resurrect a doctrine of equality of states.   
 
If the court wanted to wish a doctrine into being, it might not have 
looked like Coyle. Usually the issue of “equal sovereignty” was barely on 
point. used unequally against states that are perceived as different or 
disloyal, in areas far removed from the enumerated federal powers of Article 
I, and to subordinate states to an overarching federal system. The Court has 
always entertained pluralism in this area both to the benefit and detriment 
of states. 86 
 
b. Cases Implicating Equal Sovereignty but Avoiding Coyle 
 
Even where Coyle has not been directly cited in the Court's Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, it bears structural similarities with 
arguments made.87 In Northwest Austin, the Court, in their now-notorious 
dicta, cited two equal footing cases United States v. Louisiana and Lessee of 
Pollard v. Hagan as support for its assertions. They did not cite Coyle. 
83 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
84 See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (striking down a federal law that required states 
to take title to low-level radioactive waste within their borders and citing Coyle for the proposition 
that “The Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require 
the States to govern according to Congress's instructions”).  
85 Michael C. Tolley and Bruce A. Wallin, Coercive Federalism and the Search for Constitutional 
Limits, 25 PUBLIUS 73, 89 (1995). 
86 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (upholding Florida law that regulated taking of sealife 
by Florida residents in the high seas as part of the inherent sovereignty of all states); Joplin 
Mercantile Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 531 (1915) (upholding a provision of Oklahoma's 
Enabling Act that required the state to prohibit sales of liquor to Indians). 
87 See e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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In Northwest Austin, the court (not yet ready to overturn Katzenbach) 
completely avoided mentioning Coyle as well as the term “equal footing.” And 
yet three other cases are cited. Even there, similarly situated states are 
treated alike, and those states with a different history are treated 
differently.88  
 
There is no discussion of lateral “equality” among states and no 
suggestion that the constitution requires equal treatment of states 89 Texas v. 
White simply explained how statehood was indissoluble both for Texas and 
earlier states, and any language suggesting equality of states is used to this 
purpose: “All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties of 
republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State… The 
union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and 
as indissoluble as the union between the original States.”90 This description 
is less like sovereignty alone and more like citizenship, wherein a certain 
kind of equality is an aspect.91  
 
In Northwest Austin, the Court, in their now-notorious dicta, cited two 
equal footing cases United States v. Louisiana and Lessee of Pollard v. 
Hagan,92 but not Coyle, as support for its assertions. They cited a truncated 
passage from Katzenbach to overrule the actual holding in that passage of 
Katzenbach. All that remained in Shelby to resurrect the “equal footing 
doctrine” was to rely upon Northwest Austin, and the previously narrowed 
88 United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960) a foreign relations case regarding maritime 
boundaries of particular states end and those of the United States as a whole. 
89 Texas having claimed a maritime boundary at three marine leagues from her coast when she 
was an independent republic prior to admission to the Union, and this boundary having been 
confirmed pursuant to the Annexation Resolution of 1845, Texas was entitled, under the 
Submerged Lands Act, to a grant of three marine leagues from her coast for domestic purposes. 
United States v. States of La., Tex., Miss., Ala., & Fla., 363 U.S. 1, 80 S.Ct. 961 (1960) 
supplemented sub nom.  United States v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 288, 86 S.Ct. 419 (1965).  
90 United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 16 (1960) Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 
(1845)); Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725–726 (1869). 
91 The majority would almost certainly be hostile to the importation of public international law 
into this area, though the concept of sovereign equality in that field is descended from a similar 
set of natural law doctrines. Being folded into a sovereign, the moment of statehood (some precede 
the nation-state and others created within its borders or designated from among its territories). 
Thus the problem of statehood within a federal union more neatly divides the international law 
two theories of recognition, called “declaratory” and “constitutive.” See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 
RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2, 38–66; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 16–25; GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES UNEQUAL 
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (Noting that sovereign equality of nation-states 
has been qualified by the existence of legalized hegemony and anti-pluralism.). 
92 United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 16 (1960) (citing Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 
212, 223 (1845)); see also Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725–726 (1869). 
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Coyle doctrine. seemed to get its notion of a tradition of state equal 
sovereignty from the so-called “equal footing” doctrine—The suggestion is 
that, in fact, equal footing case law suggests the opposite. This truncated 
sentence appears: “The doctrine of the equality of States … does not bar… 
remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”93 The meaning is 
precisely the opposite of what Katzenbach stated and intended. By the time 
the Shelby majority reclaimed the inverted principle, they were able to claim 
a departure from the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” would 
require a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is 
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets. 
 
Northwest Austin left the constitutionality sections 4 and 5 untouched, 
but smuggled in a foundational concept for the majority’s reasoning in 
Shelby. In Shelby, section 5 was not struck down, but striking down the 
section 4 coverage formula, the Court rendered section 5 inoperative. If 
things were getting better, was this because of section 5 or despite it? The 
question now is whether a world without section 5 will make evident the 
progress that has been made or lead to immediate retrogression. The fate of 
pre-clearance remains either litigation by an activist justice department 
using a dynamic preclearance regime rooted in bail-out and bail-in 
provisions, or else with Congress amending the VRA.  
 
The majority was certainly audacious in relying upon this doctrine for 
their decision, but in other ways they were risk averse. While they set a path 
for giving legal expression to defeated doctrines of federalism, they also 
avoided the conventional confrontation between states’ rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The stealth strategy meant sidelining precedents 
that might have provided similar arguments for states’ rights.  
 
In this way, insofar as the Fifteenth Amendment goes, there is no 
constitutional principle remaining in this area. Whatever “equal sovereignty” 
principle is being invoked, it is already a defeated doctrine.  
 
What remains is a very different doctrine, which is more properly a 
principle of equality “between states” rather than between states and the 
Federal government. This is how the Court, first in Northwest Austin (2009), 
and now with far greater consequences in Shelby, elevated an obscure and 
93 Katzenbach, supra note 74, at 328–329: “[i]n acceptable legislative fashion, Congress chose to 
limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate action seemed necessary.  The 
doctrine of the equality of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that 
doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the 
remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” 
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largely irrelevant doctrine (the “equal footing” doctrine) to a “fundamental 
principle” of Constitutional law. In doing so, it mischaracterized the scope, 
purpose, and meaning of that doctrine re-casting it as much broader principle 
requiring “equality of sovereigns.” Remarkably, the applicability of the 
doctrine took a short step from being completely rejected in Katzenbach, 
resurrected in Northwest Austin merely by reference to Katzenbach, and fully 
operative as a constitutional principle in Shelby sufficient to strike down 
Article 4. The court’s audacity in this regard has not gone unnoticed.94  
 
The majority in Shelby relied most directly on Northwest Austin 
seemed to get its notion of a tradition of state equal sovereignty from the so-
called “equal footing” doctrine, But the equal footing doctrine doesn’t support 
the idea that otherwise valid federal legislation treating states unequally is 
suspect for that reason. In Shelby, in addition to the equal sovereignty cases 
discussed in Northwest Austin, Coyle reappeared, no longer chastened by 
Katzenbach.  
 
It is a minor jurisprudence that may prove to enter the Constitutional 
canon. 95   Like another minor jurisprudence that has emerged in recent 
years—the Court’s jurisprudence of “state dignity” in the context of sovereign 
immunity— the Shelby majority’s articulation of “state equality” has an 
expressive function. 96  It is expressive of the same broader views on the 
equality of states with the Federal government— the values that lost 
constitutional protection with the Fifteenth amendment, “dignity” concerns, 
the losing arguments in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence— all smuggled in 
on the back of a relatively obscure doctrine.  
 
I argue here that the court dug into a past battle that had been lost 
and copy-pasted a discredited strand of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence in 
this new context. The language of equal sovereignty is borrowed from a 
limited doctrine, but its underlying principles are copy-pasted from a 
discredited strand of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, and the aspirations 
94Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 177 (2013), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/06/08/fishkin.html. (“Rather audaciously, the Northwest Austin 
Court quoted this very sentence from Katzenbach as support for the idea that a “doctrine of the 
equality of the states” exists— concealing the part about how “that doctrine applies only to the 
terms upon which States are admitted to the Union” behind a strategically placed ellipsis.”) 
95 J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARVARD L. REV. 963 
(1998); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon 17 CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMENTARY 295 (2000) 
96 Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 81 (2001); Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1 (2003). 
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and resentments that animate it are pulled from that earlier confrontation, 
just as the folk wisdom of the court seems to recycle rhetoric from other lost 
battles in American history: the defense of Jim Crow laws, resentment 
against reconstruction, and even efforts to prop up slavery before the Civil 
War.97   
 
The difference here is that none of those earlier struggles is likely to be 
fought again. But the decision is Shelby may just be a prelude to resurgence 
in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence reinvigorating the concepts of dignity 
and equality of sovereign states. According to Peter Onuf, “the conditions do 
not seem to have engrained themselves too deeply in the minds of the people 
of the states in question, or their historians for that matter… In the longer 
historical perspective the conditions appear to have faded into memory-even 
in the South, the ire of "Redeemers" appears to have been focused on the 
substantive issues of black suffrage and civil rights (and the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments that enshrined these principles), rather than the fact 
that these requirements were also imposed through the readmission 
conditions.”98  
 
It is the states that can vindicate the rights of the individual is not 
new and it was articulated from the Federalist Papers to National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012). 99  In the Tenth Amendment, 
reserving powers to the states was seen as a truism, but one that seems to 
have linking the states to “the people” seems to have had more of an afterlife 
than any other handwritten afterthought. There are legalist and populists 
97 JAMES RONALD KENNEDY AND WALTER DONALD KENNEDY, THE SOUTH WAS RIGHT! 174 (The 
authors of this neo-confederate text lump the “the punitive Southern-only” Voting Rights Act with 
other familiar charges of barbarity, hypocrisy, and infamy by the North, and by extension the 
post-bellum Federal republic).  
98 Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The Ambiguous History of a Constitutional Principle, 18 
PUBLIUS 53 (1988); William A. Dunning, "Are the States Equal Under the Constitution?" 3 
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 425-453 (1888). 
Chief Justice Roberts articulated this view of federalism in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 4 (2012) (Stating that “State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: 
Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.” quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 759 (1991) New York v. United States, 505 
U. S. 144, 181 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) Because the police power is controlled by 
50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on 
citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed. The 
Framers thus ensured that powers which “in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, 
liberties, and properties of the people” were held by governments more local and more accountable 
than a distant federal bureaucracy. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 293 (J. Madison). The independent 
power of the States also serves as a check on the power of the Federal Government: “By denying 
any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects 
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strands of this movement, and they sometimes converge. There have been 
legal arguments as well as purely expressive ones emanating from 
movements which going back over a hundred years have gone by names such 
as “Redeemers” “Lost Cause” “Neo-Confederate,” “Dixiecrats,” 100 “Southern 
Strategy,” “Tenthers” or “Constitution in Exile.” Taken together, these are 
not only exotic extremists, but also mainstream legal scholars and 
ideologically-driven legislators (including those who have introduced “Tenth 
Amendment Resolutions” in state legislatures). Carrying with them the torch 
of liberty (the kind favored by libertarians as well as states’ rights advocates) 
they arrive at arguments that range from moderate constitutional balancing 
to threats of secession. What the Shelby County decision signals may be 
slightly different from what it accomplishes as precedent or as guidance to 
Congress, but it is no less significant.  
 
II. EXPRESSIVE HARMS: CONDITIONALITY AND SELECTIVITY 
As much as Shelby hinders the future implementation of the Voting 
Rights Act, it also serves an expressive function. Along with interpreting the 
law, it is also is concerned with “making statements” of a more general 
nature.101 Some have argued these statements are empty gestures, based on 
nothing more than nostalgia for states’ rights,102 like a sub-genre of Lost 
Cause literature, equal parts propaganda and self-delusion, but it is worth 
taking notice that through a combination of pragmatism and expressivity, the 
Court managed to eviscerate the most effective legislation devised in the civil 
rights era.  
 
According to Fishkin, the possible “dignitary harm” in the VRA, pre-
clearance, and the coverage formula “lies in treating the South—the former 
Confederacy—differently from most of the rest of the states in a particular 
way that carries with it the implication that the past is not dead.” Moreover, 
he argues, “federal oversight” carries with it a “faint echo especially in its 
100 RONALD STORY AND BRUCE LAURIE, ED. THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA, 1945–2000: A 
BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 39 (2008). (Point Four of the 1948 platform of Strom Thurmond’s 
“States’ Rights Democratic Party”—the Dixiecrats— weaves together the public and private in a 
seamless and visible whole: “We stand for the segregation of the races and the racial integrity of 
each race; the constitutional right to choose one’s associates; to accept private employment 
without governmental interference, and to earn one’s living in any lawful way. We oppose the 
elimination of segregation, the repeal of miscegenation statutes, the control of private 
employment by Federal bureaucrats called for by the misnamed civil rights program. We favor 
home-rule, local self-government and a minimum interference with individual rights.”). 
101 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 44 U. PENN. L. REV. 2021 (1996).   
102 Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 177 (2013). 
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geographic outline of Reconstruction itself.” 103 The expressive harm here is 
suggested by Justice Roberts in his statements and dicta. It is also addressed 
by the revival and extension of the equal footing doctrine as one that insists 
upon the “equality and dignity in power” among the several states. 
Opponents of the coverage formula struck down in Shelby argued that it was 
targeted and punitive, invoking a longer history of conquest. Defenders of the 
formula were more divided, arguing that it was (1) targeted but not punitive, 
(2) neither targeted nor punitive, or (3) targeted and punitive but perfectly 
constitutional. I take the third of these views. In truth, particular states were 
conquered at least three times: by arms, by constitutional amendment, and 
by legislation, and the courts and legislatures remain viable options for 
resistance. Even if other states were swept in from time to time (such as 
those with linguistic minorities), it remained the states that belonged to the 
former Confederacy who were unable to demonstrate sufficient commitment 
to equality in order to bail out of the preclearance regime. Insofar as the 
formula stigmatized certain states, this was not entirely unintended either. 
In my view, it is not helpful to deny or repress the violence that brought us to 
this point, and led both to opposite results by the two branches. It was out of 
a conviction that selectivity carried some moral weight that Congress 
extended the Act without revising the coverage formula, while the court’s 
majority acted out the conviction that they were vindicating certain 
counterclaims to justice, even against the proper reading of the law. 
 
Over the years, section 5 in particular attracted a great deal of 
admiration as well as controversy. The supporters of section 5 have a 
normative commitment to the purpose that was rearticulated in 2006 when 
the section was amended to clarify that the proposed laws must not have 
either the intent or the effect of ‘‘diminishing the ability of any citizens of the 
United States’’ because of race, color, or membership in a language minority 
group defined in the Act “to elect their preferred candidate of choice.”104 
Congress’s power to act vigorously in this area has been reaffirmed over the 
years. 105  Opponents of the section have had a more eclectic grab bag of 
103 Id. 
104 42 U.S.C. 1973c (b) & (d).  See also FEDERAL REGISTER / Vol. 76, No. 27 / Wednesday, February 
9, 2011. Notices U.S. Department of Justice Guidance Concerning Redistricting  Under Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/sec5guidance2011.pdf. 
105 Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535 (1973) (reaffirming that “the Act is a permissible 
exercise of congressional power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment”); City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 (1980) (explaining that “we have reaffirmed our holdings in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach that the Act is ‘an appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ 
constitutional responsibilities’ and is ‘consonant with all . . . provisions of the Constitution”) 
(quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) ); Lopez v. Monterrey County, 
525 U.S. 266, 283 (1999) (reaffirming that “Congress has the constitutional authority to designate 
covered jurisdictions and to guard against changes that give rise to a discriminatory effect in 
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arguments, ranging from disapproval of the ways section 5 has enabled the 
creation majority-minority districts, to the idea that just because states once 
acted in a particular way, it does not mean they will in the future.  Northwest 
Austin set out “two principal inquiries”: (1) whether the “current burdens” 
imposed by section 5 “are “justified by current needs” and (2) whether section 
5’s “‘disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem it 
targets.’” 106 The first question relates to the overcoming weight of history as 
well as coercive burdens (conditionality) and the second question deals with 
overcoming disparate treatment (selectivity). The court moved both questions 
to section 4’s coverage formula rather than the practice of preclearance. 
According to Peter Onuf, descendants of White southerners are more likely to 
decry the end of slavery and segregation, “rather than the fact that these 
requirements were also imposed through the readmission conditions.”107 It 
actually seems like the opposite is true: since many of these issues have long 
been off the table, using “post-racial” rhetoric, the fact of continuing 
“conquest” (selectivity and conditionality) have become the main sites for 
struggle. There are legalist and populists strands of this rhetoric and they 
sometimes converge.  Perhaps “equal sovereignty” were serve as new 
galvanizing norm, drawing the energies of those who would champion state 
sovereignty, but find few openings within the mainstream of cons titutional 
doctrine.108  
 
1. Critique of Conditionality: The VRA Wrongfully Coerced 
States 
 
The first critique that can be traced from opposition to the VRA context 
back through its precursors is that this form of federal regulation wrongfully 
coerces states with burdensome conditions. Justice Black objected to the 
provisions of the VRA “which force[d] any one of the states to entreat federal 
authorities in far-away places for approval of local laws before they can 
become effective” He went on to say this is “to create the impression that the 
State or States treated in this way are little more than conquered 
provinces.” 109  More recently the Cato Institute’s amicus brief in Shelby 
claimed “[t]he VRA effectively put southern states under federal electoral 
receivership.” Aside from the selectivity, the idea of undue burdens being 
those jurisdictions”). 
106 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203. 
107 Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The Ambiguous History of a Constitutional Principle, 18 
PUBLIUS 53 (1988); William A. Dunning, "Are the States Equal Under the Constitution?" 3 
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 425-453 (1888). 
108 MARK R. KILLENBECK (ED.), “THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES” (2001).  
109 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 360 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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placed upon any state, tracks cultural memories and representations of 
conquest. Either as a product of a longer cultural memory, or simply a glib 
analogy, the preclearance and even bailout provisions would me reminiscent 
of loyalty requirements, and conditionality for full sovereignty.  
The point, however, is that the VRA should be punitive, or at least 
sufficiently coercive to deter the conduct it is designed to deter.  
 
2. Critique of Selectivity: The VRA Invidiously Targeted 
Particular States 
 
The second objection is the historical and geographic specificity of the 
states being treated as “conquered provinces.” Earlier arguments in the 
contending narratives also pointed to ‘selectivity’ by charging the Union, and 
later the Federal government, not with domination or elitism, but with 
hypocrisy. 110  In this view, each successive effort has been marred by 
selectivity. The same measures opponents of the VRA (and before it, the 
Reconstruction amendments) would call “hypocritical” or “selective,” however, 
its defenders would call proportional and narrowly-tailored. Among those 
who views selectivity as a virtue is Akhil Amar, who connects the VRA to the 
longer history: 
 
Congressional Republicans openly admitted that many Northern states 
also had imperfect track records, but these congressional leaders 
insisted that Article IV authorized the federal government to draw 
sensible lines targeting the worst state offenders. In 1866, most 
Northern states disfranchised blacks, but because free blacks 
constituted a significantly higher percentage of the population of the 
former Confederacy, it was not unfair — on the contrary, it was 
necessary and proper — for Congress to target these worst-offending 
states and to administer to these states specially strong medicine that 
limited their previously unfettered and previously abused freedom over 
voting laws.111  
 
On the other hand, viewing the same history“[o]pponents cried foul in the 
name of federalism, states’ rights, and equal treatment for all states.” 112 
 
Unlike Amar, who candidly approves of such “specially strong 
medicine,” other defenders of the VRA would deny that it has ever been 
110 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES (1985).  
111 Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5 — and thus of Section 5, 126 HARVARD L. REV. FORUM 
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either targeted or punitive. Pointing to a facially neutral coverage formula (it 
did not mention states, though it did refer to conduct and dates), supporters 
of Article 5 regime could say supported its continuation not to humiliate or 
stigmatize the twice-defeated South, but to deter future discriminatory 
practices. Indeed, the covered jurisdictions were not identical to the 
Confederacy, or the Jim Crow South, or even limited to the geographical 
southern states. It was about other struggles as well, such as the struggle for 
inclusion by linguistic minorities into full and meaningful participation. 
Those who wish to emphasize the facial neutrality of the coverage formula 
could emphasize the inclusion of the counties that overlap with the boroughs 
of New York City, to show that the formula was neither about Red and Blue 
states, nor the old Blue and Grey. Parts of New York California, and Texas 
were covered because they have significant populations of linguistic 
minorities, and Alaska and Arizona have continued to be covered for the 
same reason.  
 
For others on both sides of the question, history was crucial. Most 
defenders of the formula, including the dissent in Shelby County, characterize 
the coverage formula as targeted but not punitive.113 “There is no question, 
moreover, that the covered jurisdictions have a unique history of problems 
with racial discrimination in voting.”114  The targeting is as often described in 
facially neutral terms as it is historically contextualized. “Consideration of 
this long history, still in living memory, was altogether appropriate.”  
Preclearance was “a procedure which, while not always burdensome, 
nevertheless was viewed by many as an “important political symbol” by local 
officials: “a vivid stigma recalling the sins of past generations.”115 Even if 
Section 4 was not exclusively about re-fighting the Civil War or even the civil 
rights movement, it imported gained the force of principle from association 
with these struggles. More than the dissent, though, it is the majority 
(starting in  Northwest Austin and continuing through the oral arguments in 
Shelby County) that kept whistling Dixie despite its stated position that no 
113 The website of the civil rights coalition the Leadership conference, asks and answers the 
question “Because of its limited application, is Section 5 used to "punish" certain states?” by 
saying “Section 5 is not punitive; it prohibits discriminatory changes affecting the right to vote. 
The Voting Rights Act has no provisions that name particular states or areas. Section 5 is aimed 
at a type of problem, not a state or region.” On the other hand, the “It is designed to prevent 
backsliding” Congress therefore included the Section 5 preclearance provision to prevent the 
implementation of new discriminatory laws. The objections made since 1965 showed the covered 
jurisdictions have attempted to use gerrymandering and other forms of discrimination to abridge 
the right to vote. Section 5 has focused on these efforts. “Voting Rights Act Frequently Asked 
Questions”, http://www.civilrights.org/voting-rights/vra/faq.html#question6.  
114 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. at 2642.  
115 Thomas M. Boyd and Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments To The Voting Rights Act: A 
Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1427 (1983). 
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state or region should be stigmatized. Supporters of the VRA should have 
been more forcefully committed to the idea that both selectivity and 
conditionality were appropriate. The point is that the VRA should be 
punitive, or at least sufficiently coercive to deter the conduct it is designed to 
deter, and targeted enough to accomplish what the Fifteenth Amendment 
demanded of states.   
 
3. The Expressive and Instrumental Functions of State 
Dignity and State Equality  
 
What is the actual advantage of referring to “equal sovereignty” and 
not just “state sovereignty” as it more familiar in federalism debates? 
Certainly a reinvigorated notion of states’ rights fits well with other 
jurisprudential strands as well a stream of right wing populism and 
literature that is helping to shape contemporary politics.  In its form 
“sovereignty” is analogous to “liberty” not to “equality” and therefore the role 
of concepts like “equal sovereignty of states” is not self-evident to those 
engaged in federalism debates. Instead what is generally at stake in these 
debates is the freedom of the states vs. the federal government to legislate, 
adjudicate, regulate or act as they please is generally what is at stake. The 
Supremacy Clause settles some of these issues, and others remain open.116 To 
introduce a term like “equality” into the characterization of states as 
sovereigns requires an additional argument, additional evidence, and an 
additional motivation.   
 
In the modern context, insofar as there are still territorial entities 
vying for statehood, the concept of equality of statehood may not be 
meaningless. Residents of Washington D.C. or Puerto Rico contend with 
second-class status in terms of representation, some within these areas 
aspire to statehood, understanding that such a status mediate protections of 
status, and full citizenship. Here, statehood within a republican form of 
government would itself be the prize, and not the fear of being denominated a 
second-class state. Thus, what the actual “equal footing” doctrine would 
accomplish in this context is far from clear. 117 Also, if “statehood” is the 
116 Nina Markey, The Political Boundary Requirement of Article IV, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the 
New Jersey Constitution Must Be Breached in Order to Comply with the Voting Rights Act and the 
Supremacy Clause; 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1375 (2003-2004); 
117 Javier J. Rua Jovet, The Fourth Option: Modern Self-Determination of Peoples and the 
Possibilities of U.S. Federalism, 49 REV. DER. P.R. 163 (2009-2010); the footing argument occupied 
one side of a continuum in a discourse on loyalty for newly admitted states: Eric Biber, Price of 
Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 
The; 46 Am. J. Legal Hist. 119 (2004). It also has implications for choice of law principles, and 
full-faith and credit laws. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
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protected classification, how does the doctrine apply to the diversity of 
covered jurisdictions, which are municipal entities of all types?118 Covered 
jurisdictions need not even be states.  
 
The move to equality accomplishes more than the expressive function. 
If the function of equal sovereignty is limited to an expressive function, it 
might play a role in galvanizing political movements. The expressive function 
supports an instrumental one. For example, consider the mediating concept 
of state dignity evident in oral arguments (where Justice Kennedy referred to 
the “equal dignity” of sovereigns). 119  “Equal dignity” of states brings 
“sovereign equality” discourse a little closer to the concerns of federalism 
debates and the states’ rights concerns that emanate from the Tenth 
Amendment and Article IV of the Constitution. But the value of “equality” is 
instrumental and not only expressive. As I argue below, the “misrecognition” 
of this doctrine is crafted in order to accommodate contemporary demands for 
states’ rights, and implicit in the analysis is a new standard of review.   
 
III. EXPERIMENTING WITH EQUALITY: HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
AFTER SHELBY COUNTY 
If it is taken seriously as a legal doctrine, then it might inch away from 
its narrow role as an “equal footing” standard, and aspire towards a kind of 
“equal protection” argument available to states. This possibility was explicitly 
rejected in Katzenbach, which also dealt with ingenious attempts by South 
Carolina to extend due process and bill of attainder protections to states.   
 
The instrumental accomplishment of Shelby County is that under any 
successor to the VRA, or any similar legislation, differential treatment of 
covered and non-covered jurisdictions must be subject to heightened scrutiny. 
Though the Court never explicitly defines their standard of review, it is not 
strict scrutiny, but certainly heightened, taking away some deference from an 
ordinary rational basis standard, and focusing on differential treatment of 
states. In what until now has been an entirely different site for applying such 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L.REV. 249 (1992). None of these, 
however, exempt states from Federal civil rights legislation. 
118For a comparison of states and other municipal units, see Allan, Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
119 But conceptions of dignity are also plural, and multiply among all the subjects and sovereigns 
who claim it. See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the 
Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1933-58 (2003) (discussing 
this sovereign conception of state dignity and contrasting it with other conceptions of dignity 
operative in our law); see also Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 169, 192-99 (2011). 
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scrutiny, “disparate treatment” can be challenged under equal protection 
analysis, which requires heightened scrutiny for laws discriminating against 
discrete and insular minorities. The notion that states qualify for equal 
protection was rejected out of hand by the court in Katzenbach, along with 
the applicability the narrower doctrine that new states enter the Union on an 
equal footing with their predecessors as articulated under Coyle v. Oklahoma. 
 
1. Boerne Again?: Does Shelby County Inaugurate a New 
Standard of Review? 
 
While silently over-turning Katzenbach’s clear statement on the 
inapplicability of the equal footing doctrine, the court side-stepped several 
important questions, including the applicable standard of review. Many 
commentators found this anti-climactic, and others seemed either relieved or 
disappointed that the heightened test from Boerne was not explicitly applied, 
and still believe the Court will have to address whether Section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment is subject to deferential “rational basis” standard set 
forth in Katzenbach or the more demanding one from Boerne.  
 
In the wake of Shelby County, one of the most important lingering 
questions is whether the Court has imported the heightened standard of 
scrutiny for Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (congruence and 
proportionality from Boerne v. Flores) to Section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. It might have seemed so. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments each conclude with nearly-identically-worded sections 
giving Congress powers to enforce the Amendment “by appropriate 
legislation”120 The Court has found that each section should be interpreted 
similarly, unpacking “appropriate” to mean “congruent and proportional.” In 
a line of cases starting with City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court the 
mid-1990s had begun to limit the power of Congress to enforce the 
guarantees of the Civil War Amendments, crafting a “congruence and 
proportionality” test to assess the constitutionality of congressional efforts to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.121 In Boerne, using this test, the Court 
struck a balance, reaffirming the power of Congress to enact prophylactic 
rules to protect established constitutional guarantees while striking down 
efforts to provide additional guarantees not properly rooted in the 
Constitution. What has been seen in subsequent cases Congress had to be 
120 Thirteenth Amendment, §2: Fourteenth Amendment, §5:  Fifteenth Amendment, §2. 
121 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 637 (1999); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000); Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Coleman v. 
Maryland Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
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enforcing actual constitutional guarantees – there must be a “congruence and 
proportionality” between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end – but once it was, the Court recognized that 
Congress had wide latitude to act.122 That balance allowed the Court to limit 
the reach of federal age and disability discrimination laws and, most recently, 
the Family and Medical Leave Act. 123  On the other side, certain 
commentators while recognizing City of Boerne v. Flores and its progeny have 
effectively limited Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment powers via doctrines of 
“congruence” and “proportionality,” 124  insist this is not necessary in the 
Fifteenth Amendment context, which is already constrained to the area of 
voting rights. 125  Insofar as the Fifteenth Amendment “amended” and 
therefore “trumps” the Tenth Amendment.”126 And, while it is generally true 
that states retain broad powers to regulate elections, the Fifteenth 
Amendment modified those powers with respect to denying or abridging 
voting rights based upon race or color. Even strictly construed, Fifteenth 
Amendment describes Congress's power to ensure the right to vote regardless 
of race or color as plenary. As such, the Tenth Amendment is inoperative to 
prevent or limit Congress's authority to legislate these matters.127 The Court 
in Boerne was concerned that Congress might invent constitutional rights in 
the guise of enacting enforcement legislation. That concern does not have any 
force when it comes to the Fifteenth Amendment’s focused and express 
prohibition on racial discrimination in voting.128  Most commentators believe 
the application of Boerne would have established a less deferential standard 
based on congruence and proportionality. (“There must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the 
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may 
122 See e.g., Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003) (“Congress 
may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in 
order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.”); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 
(2004) (explaining that “Congress must have a wide berth in devising appropriate remedial and 
preventative measures for unconstitutional actions”). 
123 Kimel, 528 U.S. 62; Garrett, 531 U.S. 356; Coleman, 132 S.Ct. 1327. 
124 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
125 Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5 — and thus of Section 5, 126 HARVARD L. REV. FORUM 
109, 120 (2013).  
126 Paul Abrams, “The Fifteenth Amendment Trumps the Tenth Amendment on Voting Rights,” 
HUFFINGTON POST. July 1, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-abrams/the-Fifteenth-
amendment-trumps_b_3527256.html.  
127 In the context of the Fifteenth Amendment, we need not settle the ongoing Tenth Amendment 
controversies over “enumerated powers” those “expressly granted” and that Congress has great 
latitude employing the “necessary and proper” clause. 
128 Fifteenth Amendment only provides limited authority for Congress to ban discrimination in 
voting, and the Court may have wanted to examine whether Congress’s powers to mandate voter 
equality are broader under the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees legal equality.    
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become substantive in operation and effect”).129  
 
Yet the majority did not even cite Boerne,130 possibly as not to attract 
vigorous dissent, or so the serious problems with equal sovereignty would 
pass under the radar. Critics of the opinion can take some relief that they did 
not add another case to the Boerne line of cases, even as they are frustrated 
that Katzenbach is being abandoned piecemeal. But there is another 
possibility. In my view, it might be a false choice between Boerne and 
Katzenbach and the moment for choosing has already passed. Indeed as the 
Court of Appeals in Shelby County noted, Boerne itself “relied quite heavily 
on Katzenbach for the proposition that section 5, as originally enacted and 
thrice extended, was a model of congruent and proportional legislation.”131 
Instead, by declining to use either test, the Court is signaling that embedded 
somewhere in Northwest Austin or Shelby County itself, there is a new test 
being fabricated for the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment and Voting 
Rights jurisprudence.   Northwest Austin was known until Shelby as a case 
that avoided all constitutional issues, and yet the Shelby County court relies 
on it heavily, not only for a substantive doctrine but also a standard of 
review. 132  Since Constitutional avoidance was so central to the holding, 
Shelby will quickly displace it as setting both the terms of the equal 
sovereignty doctrine (overturning Katzenbach and resurrecting Coyle) and 
the standard of review for future cases (overturning Katzenbach and cloning 
Boerne).  The Court has held that principles of federalism place limitations on 
the Fourteenth Amendment in Boerne. Shelby County could be seen as the 
Fifteenth Amendment analog to Boerne, but it inaugurates a test that stands 
alone.  This might be more damaging to Congress’s power under the 
Fifteenth Amendment than either Boerne or Katzenbach, which represent a 
continuum of rational and proportional, but do not pretend to model their 
tests on a kind of equal protection analysis.  
It might be predicted that Shelby will be to the Fifteenth Amendment 
what Boerne was to the Fourteenth Amendment, and certainly each case 
articulates a principle of federalism placing limitations on regulatory statutes 
justified under the respective amendments. But this discourse is no longer 
129 Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2164. 
130 Richard Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future Jurisprudence of Voting 
Rights and Race, SCOTUSBLOG, Jun. 25, 2013, http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/the-
curiousdisappearance-of-boerne-and-the-future-jurisprudence-of-voting-rights-and-race/. 
131 Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2012) rev’d , 133 S.Ct. 2612  (2013) and 
vacated and remanded 541 F. App x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
132 As Rick Hasen noted, though the Court flagged the issue in Northwest Austin, CJ Roberts 
ignored Boerne, except for a single sentence: “Both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
were at issue in Northwest Austin . . . and accordingly Northwest Austin guides our review under 
both Amendments in this case.” 
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about federalism, the structure of the relationship between the states and the 
federal government, and the details of shared sovereignty. It is about treating 
states as protected “persons” to some degree. What is new, even to equal 
footing doctrine, is that the Court is suddenly applying tiers of scrutiny to 
regulatory statutes that facially discriminate between states in almost 
precisely the same way they would conduct an equal protection analysis.133 
No previous articulation of the equal footing doctrine actually supports the 
idea that “otherwise valid federal legislation treating states unequally is 
suspect.”134 For that, the Court would have to own up to what it is doing, it is 
not cloning the Coyle doctrine, or doing conducting a “equal footing” analysis, 
it is conducting something more like an equal protection analysis: it is 
treating states as protected “persons” to some degree, and without a clear 
source for this test, applying tiers of scrutiny to regulatory statutes that 
facially discriminate between states in almost precisely the same way they 
would. Though the court does not go as far as to apply “equal protection” to 
states (a still implausible mutation of doctrine) they carve out the possibility 
of engaging in the same kind of inquiry. Though the use of the term “equal 
protection” would have alerted us to the far-reaching ambition of the 
judgment, the court was careful to appear as though they were drawing upon 
a well-settled principle. But the pragmatic requirements of moderation were 
exceeded only insofar as the majority also wished to engage in a kind of 
expressivity: thus the rather pedestrian sounding “equal footing” doctrine 
was referred to as “equal sovereignty among states.”  
 
2. Cloning Coyle: Is this Equal Sovereignty a Hybrid of 
Equal Protection? 
 
Guarding against the possibility of a novel heightened standard of 
scrutiny, Ginsburg said: “Faced with subsequent reauthorizations of the 
VRA, the Court has reaffirmed [the Katzenbach] standard.”135 “Today’s Court 
does not purport to alter settled precedent establishing that the dispositive 
question is whether Congress has employed “rational means.”136 This was 
133 Gerard Magliocca, “An Equal Protection Clause for the States,” CONCURRING OPINIONS (blog), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/08/an-equal-protection-clause-for-the-states-
2.html. (Last checked December 11, 2014). (asking whether “the Court is now applying tiers of 
scrutiny to regulatory statutes that facially discriminate between states.”)  
134 Zachary Price, Shelby County v. Holder: The Voting Rights Act Doesn’t Need to Treat States 
Equally, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 16, 2013, 2:23 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-
v-holder-the-voting-rights-act-doesnt-need-to-treat-states-equally/. 
135 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324). 
136 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing e.g., City of Rome, 446 
U. S. at 178).  
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blocking Boerne but also expressing skepticism about any stealth standard 
that might have been applied. The Court reaches this less deferential 
standard without even using Boerne. We can now assume that were there an 
amendment of the VRA, with a new coverage formula, this test would be 
repeated and heightened, less deferential rational basis test, where disparate 
treatment is detected, the Court will demand a tighter fit between the 
coverage formula, which states are included and which are excluded, and the 
locations of voting rights violations.137 If the holding is not limited to facial 
discrimination, but also how regulatory statutes are applied, the Court might 
also be called upon to apply such a test to the remaining sections of the VRA, 
including section 5 if it is “applied” in a “discriminatory” manner. Justice 
Ginsburg points out that the majority’s “unprecedented extension of the 
equal sovereignty principle outside its proper domain—the admission of new 
States—is capable of much mischief.” Will the holding of Shelby County be 
expanded to include all regulatory statutes that facially discriminate between 
states, as Justice Ginsburg worried about in her dissent? Perhaps a law 
exempting some states from its regulatory requirements without any 
explanation would at least raise questions under rational basis review. But 
the VRA set out its formula explicitly. And yet the Court held that the record 
amassed by Congress when the Voting Rights Act was renewed in 2006 was 
insufficient to justify that facial discrimination between the states.  So it is 
not merely about rational basis at all. Why was that evidence inadequate?  Is 
there a reason to distinguish Congress’s power pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause from its powers under the Reconstruction Amendments?  Or is there 
something special about state authority over voting that calls for more 
demanding judicial scrutiny?  
 
What are the consequences of the Court’s “expansion of equal 
sovereignty’s sway?”138 It depends, on which “past” (and which precedent) “is 
prologue.”139 “To speak of a decision as “unprincipled” is typically to say that 
a court gave as a reason for a thus suggesting that the reason given by the 
court was not really a reason it took very seriously.”140 That may very well be 
137 Joey Fishkin, The Way Forward After Shelby County, BALKINIZATION, 8:07 PM E.S.T. (June 25, 
2013) available at http://balkin.blogspot.in/2013/06/the-way-forward-after-shelby-county.html. 
(Fishkin calls the test the court implicitly applied “rational basis with a bite,” squaring the 
characterization with the result, deducing that it was the “language in the opinion suggesting 
that the coverage formula is simply irrational” that was fatal when applied to “a statute enacted 
by Congress and supported by a 15,000 page record, described at length in the dissent, would 
ordinarily pass rational basis review.”) (emphasis added).   
138 Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
139 Justice Ginsburg quotes W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 2, sc. 1 to say “the past is 
prologue” to suggest that the past behavior of states will predict their future behavior.  I am 
suggesting here that the court might not even be this reliable or predictable.  
140 FREDRICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 178. See M. P. Golding, Principled Decision-
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the case here. The best evidence for this will be whether the court chooses to 
follow this reasoning in future cases. “Federal statutes that treat States 
disparately are hardly novelties.”141 Congress routinely passes legislation – 
earmarks, pilot projects, the management of federal property, involving local 
emergencies or contingencies- that presumes that only some rational basis is 
necessary for unequal treatment of states. It will be surprising if opponents of 
some of these legislative efforts will not now find their courts. But it will also 
be surprising if the court is now committing itself to apply a heightened 
scrutiny test in all such cases.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It remains to be seen whether the doctrine will remain an isolated for a 
particular result, or whether it is a part of a broader expressive turn in the 
area of states’ rights.  
 
Here, and perhaps in the future, “equal sovereignty” functioned as a 
heightened scrutiny test, albeit one that was not applied explicitly and this 
may be an incremental step towards developing this test in other areas. Of all 
the purposes and principles that could be served, the emphasis “equality of 
states” was an eccentric one. It remains to be seen whether the liberties the 
majority has taken to overcome history, precedent, and logic are merely 
prologue to a wider effort to resurrect moribund states’ rights doctrines. But 
on the back of the narrower concept “equal footing doctrine” as well as a set of 
doctrines, the court is crafting alongside the “proportionality and congruence” 
limits on the Fourteenth Amendment, a heightened scrutiny for laws 
enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, and may be intended as a new 
galvanizing norm, drawing the energies of those who would champion state 
sovereignty as a matter of dignity or strategy. 
 
making and the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 35 (1963); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring 
Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982 (1978). 
141 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“See e.g., 28 U. S. C. §3704 (no State may 
operate or permit a sports-related gambling scheme, unless that State conducted such a scheme 
“at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990”); 26 
U.S.C. §142(l) (EPA required to locate green building project in a State meeting specified 
population criteria); (at least 50 percent of rural drug enforcement assistance funding must be 
allocated to States with “a population density of fifty-two or fewer persons per square mile or a 
State in which the largest county has fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand people, based on 
the decennial census of 1990 through fiscal year 1997”); §§13925, 13971 (similar population 
criteria for funding to combat rural domestic violence); §10136 (specifying rules applicable to 
Nevada’s Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site, and providing that “[n]o State, other than the State 
of Nevada, may receive financial assistance under this subsection after December 22, 1987”). 
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Are we bound to dignify the court’s use of “dignity,” accept their 
equivalence between notions of “equality”? Another concern is whether we 
believe this application of the terms cheapens the realms to which such 
concepts are properly attached. A philosophical argument that extends 
rights, dignity, equality and sovereignty to states on one side, and parallel 
entitlements to individuals on the other142 may not be resolvable by reference 
to moral philosophy, but as a constitutional matter it is much simpler.143  
 
Opponents of the Shelby decision may take some comfort that the court 
may have been cynical in reaching its result. If so, the damage can be limited. 
One concern may be, as a legal matter, how serious is the court itself, is the 
reason given a reason it took very seriously.” That may very well be the case 
here. The best evidence for this will be whether the court chooses to follow 
this reasoning in future cases. In defending the idea that states who have 
acted badly in the past might be expected to do so in the future. It remains to 
be seen whether the liberties the majority has taken to overcome history, 
precedent, and logic are merely prologue to a wider effort to resurrect 
moribund states’ rights doctrines.  
 
Though the VRA survived a constitutional challenge, 144 each time it 
was amended, 145  there remained an undercurrent of discontent and an 
intuition, articulated through any number of constitutional provisions and 
quasi-constitutional arguments, that the law posed a significant intrusion on 
state sovereignty. Before Shelby v. Holder, there remained nine states, and 
local governments in seven other states 146  that were required to get 
permission from the Justice Department or a Federal Court before they could 
142 Garrett Epps, Voting Rights Act Case Pits the Rights of Humans Against the 'Sovereignty' of 
States, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY  (Feb. 24 2013).  
143 There is a convincing literature on the revolutionary effect of the Reconstruction Amendments 
on American law and society. How the court did not take on the Reconstruction amendments head 
on without being (or remaining) on the losing side of history?  The answer may be as simple (and 
ironic for popular sovereignty movements) as a 5-4 majority.  
144 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 
(1973); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Lopez v. Monterrey County, 525 U.S. 
266 (1999).   
145 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577; Voting Rights Act Amendments 
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131; Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub.  L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400; 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314. 
146 The jurisdictions most recently covered by section 5 are the states of Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, counties in 
California, Florida, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota, and townships in Michigan and 
New Hampshire. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. at 100-01 (2009).  See Civil Rights Division, U.S. 
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change any law dealing with voting. Might the Court's protection of state 
dignity be justified as an “effort to reinvigorate a long-dormant cultural 
attitude… an affinity and respect for state government-- that would promote 
the structural values of federalism in today's world?”147 More optimistically, 
the dialectic of conquest may be coming to an end, and the narrative of 
political unification may finally be one that the formerly stigmatized states 
will now adopt.148 Unfortunately after giving so much lip service to stigma 
and dignitary rights, and entering the mainstream, the formerly covered 
jurisdictions have been poised to repeat history and pass laws regressing 
from the goals of wider enfranchisement.   
 
The court has not outrun the narratives that have shaped the 
discourse up to this time. They might have believed that by relieving states of 
historical burdens, they would transcend the conflicts that shaped that 
history. At the time the VRA was passed, it made sense to focus on “bad 
actors” (through a section 4 “coverage formula”) and to put a burden on these 
past offenders to demonstrate their proposed laws would not discriminate 
(through section 5’s pre-clearance procedures).149 For now it is unclear how 
the purposes of the Act will be enforced.150 Redemption and inclusion are not 
likely at hand. Even in a world where Articles 4 and 5 are no longer 
available, the basic struggle for political participation remains, and with 
other forms of enforcement and federal oversight (Justice Department or 





147 See also Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 81 (2001).  
148 AMITAI ETZIONI, POLITICAL UNIFICATION (1965). 
149 This originally applied to states that had used a discriminatory voting law or method that was 
in effect in November 1964. More recently, the formula was changed to key it to the situation as of 
1972. 
150 Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County Contingency 
Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 131 (2013), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/06/07/charlesfuentesrohwer.html; Heather Gerken,” A Third Way 
for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach” (August 22, 2005). Harvard Public 




                                         
